For over two decades the concept of organizational commitment has attracted considerable attention in the study of organizations (Lincola & Kallebeg, 1990; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Recent efforts clarify the meaning of commitment which has taken to distinct directions. The first involves attempts to illustrate that commitment can take different forms; that is, the nature of the commitment that defines the relationship between an employee and some other entity (e.g., an organization) can vary.
The second involves efforts to distinguish among the entities to which an employee becomes committed. However, a more long-lasting distinction has been made between attitudinal commitment and behavioral commitment. This traditional distinction has important implications not only for the definition and measurement of commitment, but, also for the approaches taken in the study of its development and consequences. Mowday et. al., (1982) described these two approaches as follows:
Attitudinal commitment focuses on the process by which people come to think about their relationship with the organization. It can be thought of as a mind set in which individuals consider the extent to which their own values and goals are congruent with those in the organization. Behavioral commitment, on the other hand, relates to the process by which an individual becomes locked into a certain organization and how they deal with this problem.
The concern with organizational commitment stems mainly from the impact it is believed to have on turnover and absenteeism. Porter and his colleagues’ seminal work, (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Porter Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974), indicated that organizational commitment is a better predictor of turnover and absenteeism than job satisfaction – especially generated interest in the concept. However, despite the substantial number –of studies in the area, there is considerable disagreement on the meaning and measurement of organizational commitment (Allen & Meyer, 190; Meyer & Allen, 1991).
In a review of the commitment literature, Mowday et. al. (1982) observed little consensus on what the term commitment means. Rather, they noted that ‘researchers from various disciplines ascribed their own meanings to the topic, thereby increasing the difficulty involved in understanding the construct’. Meyer and Allen (1991) noted that the common to the various definitions of organizational commitment is “the view that commitment is a psychological state that (a) characterizes the employee’s relationship in the organization”. Thus, regardless of the definition, “committed” employees are more likely to remain in the organization than are “uncommitted” employees. However, Meyer and Allen (1991) found that the various definitions of commitment reflect three broad themes, that is, commitment has been viewed as reflecting an affective orientation toward the organization, recognition of costs associated with leaving the organization, and a moral obligation to remain with the organization.
To acknowledge that each of the three sets of definitions represent legitimate but clearly different conceptualization of the commitment construct, Meyer and Allen (1991) proposed a three-component model of organizational commitment: affective, continuance and normative.
Affective commitment refers to the employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization. Employees with a strong affective commitment continue employment with the organization because they want to do so. Continuance commitment refers to an awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Employees whose primary link to the organization is based on continuance commitment remain because they need to do so. Finally, normative commitment is a feeling of obligation to continue employment. Employees with a high level of normative commitment feel that they ought to remain with the organization.
Meyer and Allen (1991) argued that it was more appropriate to consider affective, continuance and normative commitment to be components, rather than types of commitment because an employee’s relationship with an organization might reflect varying degrees of all three. For example, one employee might feel both a strong attachment to an organization and sense of obligation to remain. A second employee might enjoy working for the organization but also recognize that leaving would be very difficult from an economic standpoint. Finally, a third employee might experience a considerable degree of desire, need, and obligation to remain with the current employer. Consequently, researchers stand to gain a clearer understanding of an employee’s relationship with an organization by considering the strength of all forms of commitment together, than by trying to classify it as being of a particular type.
Normative commitment is a relatively new aspect of organizational commitment having been defined by Bolon in 1993. Affective commitment is defined as the emotional attachment, identification, and involvement that an employee has with its organization and goals (Mowday et al, 1997, Meyer& Allen, 1993; O’Reily & Chatman). Porter et al (1974) further characterized affective commitment by three factors (1) “belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goals and values, (2) a willingness to focus effort on helping the organization achieve its goals, and (3) a desire to maintain organizational membership”. Mowday et al (1979) further state that affective communication is “when the employee identifies with a particular organization and its goals in order to maintain membership to facilitate the goal”. Meyer and Allen (1997) continue to say that employees retain membership out of choice and this is their commitment to the organization.
Continuance commitment is the willingness to remain in an organization because of the investment that the employee has with “nontransferable” investments. Nontransferable investments include things such as retirement, relationships with other employees, or things that are special to the organization (Reichers, 1985). Continuance commitment also includes factors such as years of employment or benefits that the employee may receive that are unique to the organization (Reichers, 1985). Meyer and Allen (1997) further explain that employees who share continuance commitment with their employer often make it very difficult for an employee to leave the organization.
Normative commitment (Bolon, 1993) is the commitment that a person believes that they have to the organization or their feeling of obligation to their workplace. Weiner (1982) discusses normative commitment as being a “generalized value of loyalty and duty”. Meyer and Allen (1991) supported this type of commitment prior to Bolon’s definition, with their definition of normative commitment being “a feeling of obligation”. It is argued that normative commitment is only natural due to the way we are raised in society. Normative commitment can be explained by other commitments such as marriage, family, religion, etc. therefore when it comes to one’s commitment to their place of employment they often feel like they have a moral obligation to the organization (Wiener, 1982).
Meyer et al (1993) continue to say that generally the research shows that those employee’s with a strong affective commitment will remain with an organization because they want to, those with a strong continuance commitment remain because they have to, and those with a normative commitment remain because they feel that they have to. Meyer & Allen (1997) define a committed employee as being one “stays with an organization, attends work regularly, puts in a full day and protects corporate assets, and believes in the organizational goals”. This employee positively contributes to the organization because of its commitment to the organization.
Meyer and Allen consider that these components of commitment are not mutually exclusive: an employee can simultaneously be committed to the organization in an affective, normative, and continuance sense, at varying levels of intensity. This idea led Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) to argue that at any point in time, an employee has a "commitment profile" that reflects high or low levels of all three of these mind-sets, and that different profiles have different effects on workplace behavior such as job performance, absenteeism, and the chance that the organization member will quit.
As Allen (2003) noted, continuance commitment is the degree to which the employee recognizes, or is aware, that she or he is staying because of the costs associated with leaving—not the existence of the costs themselves. Further, and critically, this awareness can stem from various events or perceptions, the nature or substance of which can be quite idiosyncratic to the individual. For this reason, Allen argues that "the best continuance commitment items are those that capture the recognition of perceived costs but do so without reference to their specific source." The emphasis on perceived costs is important; because of the accumulated evidence that the continuance commitment scale is bi-dimensional (it includes "high sacrifices" and "low alternatives" items). Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is that only the three "high sacrifice" items from the original continuance commitment scale reflect the construct of continuance commitment, and that only these items should be used to measure it.
However, Wasti (2003), while agreeing that continuance commitment should reflect high sacrifice side-bets and not low perceived alternatives, adopts a perspective on item specificity that parts company with Allen's notion that the best continuance commitment items capture perceived costs sans reference to their specific source. Wasti argues that the continuance commitment scale should not consist of "vague items expressing awareness of unspecified costs." because doing so means the continuance commitment scale will be influenced by affective and normative factors, thus conflating continuance commitment with affective and normative commitment, and thus precluding the development of a pure three-component model, in which each form of commitment has unique antecedents and unique implications for outcomes. She concludes by claiming that the current "vague" continuance commitment scale does not "reliably represent a calculative attachment to the organization" and recommends re-writing the continuance commitment scale to consist entirely of items that narrowly reflect calculative, instrumental costs as opposed to broader normative/affective social and cultural costs.
The second involves efforts to distinguish among the entities to which an employee becomes committed. However, a more long-lasting distinction has been made between attitudinal commitment and behavioral commitment. This traditional distinction has important implications not only for the definition and measurement of commitment, but, also for the approaches taken in the study of its development and consequences. Mowday et. al., (1982) described these two approaches as follows:
Attitudinal commitment focuses on the process by which people come to think about their relationship with the organization. It can be thought of as a mind set in which individuals consider the extent to which their own values and goals are congruent with those in the organization. Behavioral commitment, on the other hand, relates to the process by which an individual becomes locked into a certain organization and how they deal with this problem.
The concern with organizational commitment stems mainly from the impact it is believed to have on turnover and absenteeism. Porter and his colleagues’ seminal work, (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Porter Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974), indicated that organizational commitment is a better predictor of turnover and absenteeism than job satisfaction – especially generated interest in the concept. However, despite the substantial number –of studies in the area, there is considerable disagreement on the meaning and measurement of organizational commitment (Allen & Meyer, 190; Meyer & Allen, 1991).
In a review of the commitment literature, Mowday et. al. (1982) observed little consensus on what the term commitment means. Rather, they noted that ‘researchers from various disciplines ascribed their own meanings to the topic, thereby increasing the difficulty involved in understanding the construct’. Meyer and Allen (1991) noted that the common to the various definitions of organizational commitment is “the view that commitment is a psychological state that (a) characterizes the employee’s relationship in the organization”. Thus, regardless of the definition, “committed” employees are more likely to remain in the organization than are “uncommitted” employees. However, Meyer and Allen (1991) found that the various definitions of commitment reflect three broad themes, that is, commitment has been viewed as reflecting an affective orientation toward the organization, recognition of costs associated with leaving the organization, and a moral obligation to remain with the organization.
To acknowledge that each of the three sets of definitions represent legitimate but clearly different conceptualization of the commitment construct, Meyer and Allen (1991) proposed a three-component model of organizational commitment: affective, continuance and normative.
Affective commitment refers to the employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization. Employees with a strong affective commitment continue employment with the organization because they want to do so. Continuance commitment refers to an awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Employees whose primary link to the organization is based on continuance commitment remain because they need to do so. Finally, normative commitment is a feeling of obligation to continue employment. Employees with a high level of normative commitment feel that they ought to remain with the organization.
Meyer and Allen (1991) argued that it was more appropriate to consider affective, continuance and normative commitment to be components, rather than types of commitment because an employee’s relationship with an organization might reflect varying degrees of all three. For example, one employee might feel both a strong attachment to an organization and sense of obligation to remain. A second employee might enjoy working for the organization but also recognize that leaving would be very difficult from an economic standpoint. Finally, a third employee might experience a considerable degree of desire, need, and obligation to remain with the current employer. Consequently, researchers stand to gain a clearer understanding of an employee’s relationship with an organization by considering the strength of all forms of commitment together, than by trying to classify it as being of a particular type.
Normative commitment is a relatively new aspect of organizational commitment having been defined by Bolon in 1993. Affective commitment is defined as the emotional attachment, identification, and involvement that an employee has with its organization and goals (Mowday et al, 1997, Meyer& Allen, 1993; O’Reily & Chatman). Porter et al (1974) further characterized affective commitment by three factors (1) “belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goals and values, (2) a willingness to focus effort on helping the organization achieve its goals, and (3) a desire to maintain organizational membership”. Mowday et al (1979) further state that affective communication is “when the employee identifies with a particular organization and its goals in order to maintain membership to facilitate the goal”. Meyer and Allen (1997) continue to say that employees retain membership out of choice and this is their commitment to the organization.
Continuance commitment is the willingness to remain in an organization because of the investment that the employee has with “nontransferable” investments. Nontransferable investments include things such as retirement, relationships with other employees, or things that are special to the organization (Reichers, 1985). Continuance commitment also includes factors such as years of employment or benefits that the employee may receive that are unique to the organization (Reichers, 1985). Meyer and Allen (1997) further explain that employees who share continuance commitment with their employer often make it very difficult for an employee to leave the organization.
Normative commitment (Bolon, 1993) is the commitment that a person believes that they have to the organization or their feeling of obligation to their workplace. Weiner (1982) discusses normative commitment as being a “generalized value of loyalty and duty”. Meyer and Allen (1991) supported this type of commitment prior to Bolon’s definition, with their definition of normative commitment being “a feeling of obligation”. It is argued that normative commitment is only natural due to the way we are raised in society. Normative commitment can be explained by other commitments such as marriage, family, religion, etc. therefore when it comes to one’s commitment to their place of employment they often feel like they have a moral obligation to the organization (Wiener, 1982).
Meyer et al (1993) continue to say that generally the research shows that those employee’s with a strong affective commitment will remain with an organization because they want to, those with a strong continuance commitment remain because they have to, and those with a normative commitment remain because they feel that they have to. Meyer & Allen (1997) define a committed employee as being one “stays with an organization, attends work regularly, puts in a full day and protects corporate assets, and believes in the organizational goals”. This employee positively contributes to the organization because of its commitment to the organization.
Meyer and Allen consider that these components of commitment are not mutually exclusive: an employee can simultaneously be committed to the organization in an affective, normative, and continuance sense, at varying levels of intensity. This idea led Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) to argue that at any point in time, an employee has a "commitment profile" that reflects high or low levels of all three of these mind-sets, and that different profiles have different effects on workplace behavior such as job performance, absenteeism, and the chance that the organization member will quit.
As Allen (2003) noted, continuance commitment is the degree to which the employee recognizes, or is aware, that she or he is staying because of the costs associated with leaving—not the existence of the costs themselves. Further, and critically, this awareness can stem from various events or perceptions, the nature or substance of which can be quite idiosyncratic to the individual. For this reason, Allen argues that "the best continuance commitment items are those that capture the recognition of perceived costs but do so without reference to their specific source." The emphasis on perceived costs is important; because of the accumulated evidence that the continuance commitment scale is bi-dimensional (it includes "high sacrifices" and "low alternatives" items). Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is that only the three "high sacrifice" items from the original continuance commitment scale reflect the construct of continuance commitment, and that only these items should be used to measure it.
However, Wasti (2003), while agreeing that continuance commitment should reflect high sacrifice side-bets and not low perceived alternatives, adopts a perspective on item specificity that parts company with Allen's notion that the best continuance commitment items capture perceived costs sans reference to their specific source. Wasti argues that the continuance commitment scale should not consist of "vague items expressing awareness of unspecified costs." because doing so means the continuance commitment scale will be influenced by affective and normative factors, thus conflating continuance commitment with affective and normative commitment, and thus precluding the development of a pure three-component model, in which each form of commitment has unique antecedents and unique implications for outcomes. She concludes by claiming that the current "vague" continuance commitment scale does not "reliably represent a calculative attachment to the organization" and recommends re-writing the continuance commitment scale to consist entirely of items that narrowly reflect calculative, instrumental costs as opposed to broader normative/affective social and cultural costs.
There is a rich research tradition on "calculative" commitment, commitment based on economic exchange, which traces its theoretical lineage back to March and Simon (Mayer & Schoorman, 1996) that has been shunted aside over the past 15 or so years as the Meyer/Allen model has gained ascendancy in the literature. Perhaps measures of calculative commitment of the kind Wasti has in mind could be pitted against Meyer & Allen's continuance commitment scale to determine which kind of "cost-based commitment" has the most explanatory power. But within the context of the Meyer/Allen model, Allen's (2003) perspective makes more sense. Continuance commitment is based on Becker's theory, and as Wasti herself acknowledges, Becker contemplated commitment based on a broad array of costs, ranging from economic to cultural and social/psychological. Thus, the continuance commitment scale should include items that tap this full range of possible costs.
Normative commitment’s definition has changed since its inception (Allen, 2003). The original 1990 normative commitment scale was designed to capture normative commitment as based on Weiner’s (1982) work on the internalization of social loyalty norms to organizations. In 1993, normative commitment was re-conceptualized as an obligation to stay with the organization, without specific reference to social pressures about loyalty (Meyer et al., 1993). This conceptual shift was built in to the revised 1993 normative commitment scale. However, recently, normative commitment scale has been altered yet again, to reflect reciprocity for a benefit (Meyer et al., 2002). Still more recently, Meyer, Becker, & Van Dick (2006) refined this new reciprocity theme further, positing a two-dimensional concept of normative commitment: an "indebted obligation" aspect that reflects the perceived need to meet other's expectations, which is theorized to be correlated with continuance commitment; and a "moral imperative" aspect that reflects striving to meet valued outcomes, which is theorized to be correlated with affective commitment. Thus, the current normative commitment scale, which hasn't been revised since 1993, has not been modified to keep up with the recent conceptual revisions, and thus probably does not adequately reflect the theorized construct, which now bears a strong resemblance to social-exchange based constructs such as the psychological contract (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1995). Powell & Meyer (2004) found that contrary to expectations, social-cost side bets predicted normative commitment stronger than continuance commitment, and speculated that normative commitment might be a "special form" of continuance commitment. This idea has face validity, since an "obligation to remain" with the organization, particularly one based on reciprocity, could very well be experienced by the employee as a psychic "cost", in the form of a guilty conscience, that would have to be incurred if the employee were to break the obligation and leave. Similarly, Wasti (2003), in noting that Becker's original continuance commitment theory contemplated "generalized cultural expectations" about remaining as an antecedent, says that "Becker has in effect proposed that continuance commitment does not develop from calculative costs only, but has normative bases as well". This further confounds the issue of the discriminant validity of the normative commitment scale as measuring a distinct form of commitment. Clearly, additional empirical work, using a revised normative commitment scale that comports with the latest conceptualization, is needed to address whether normative commitment really is a form of commitment, or an antecedent of commitment.
Some researchers reviewed the relational cohesion theory to develop a model of organizational commitment. The relational cohesion theory is based on the belief that social exchange is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It occurs in neighbors’ exchanges of favors, peers’ exchanges of assistance, friends’ exchanges of gifts, scholars’ exchanges of research ideas, and even spouses of partners’ exchanges of affection. A common principle underlying these exchanges is reciprocal obligation (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). If one asks a friend a favor, this entails a general expectation of future return. This aspect of reciprocal obligation differentiates social exchange from economic transactions. While the lack of reciprocity makes each economic transaction discrete and independent, the reciprocity principle in social exchange entails repetition and obligations in future interaction. Consummating a social exchange necessarily builds up feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust among partners, all of which lays a foundation of social solidarity and micro social order even without binding contracts. Social exchange theory emphasizes the structural context of transactions in which two or more actors seek to arrive at a satisfactory exchange of benefits. The context of a relationship is structured by repeated opportunities for social transactions among the same actors (Emerson, 1981).
The structural cohesion in exchange relations promotes relational cohesion and behavioral commitment. Among the standard exchange theory explanations for relationship development is that certain power-dependence conditions in exchange relations promote frequent exchange with the same actors (Emerson, 1972; Lawler, The, Yoon, 2000). Expectation confirmation and reduced transaction costs are considered as benefits of staying with the same actor (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1981; Molm, 1994; Molm and Cook, 1995). Research in cognitive psychology explains this in terms of uncertainty aversion, wherein individuals tend to avoid uncertain decision contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This same theme emerges in a variety of other commitment explanations, ranging from those centered on trust (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) or relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1981) to those dealing with embeddedness within larger social units (Granovetter, 1985).
Taken as a whole, these theories generally agree that reduced uncertainty sets the focal relation or group apart from others and inclines actors to perceive greater instrumental value in focal relations or groups. Rational choice theories and network exchange theories have also attempted to resolve the same problem by embedding a variety of incentive configurations in social structures. They assume that, once optimal incentive structures for multiple actors are configured and imposed exogenously on a given social relation or structure, actors would actualize them. The identities of those who carry the incentive structure do not matter because neither barriers nor coordination problems are assumed in realizing potential incentive structures (Hardin, 1968; Hechter, 1987; Macy, 1993: Yamagishi, 1995).
Social exchange is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It occurs in neighbors’ exchanges of favors, peers’ exchanges of assistance, friends’ exchanges of gifts, scholars’ exchanges of research ideas, and even spouses of partners’ exchanges of affection. A common principle underlying these exchanges is reciprocal obligation (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). Emerson’s (1972, 1981) exchange theory provides a breakthrough in analyzing the enduring exchange relation in terms of power and dependence. Emerson (1972) identifies this as a “cohesion effect” of mutual power, and Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) notion of mutual-fate control also taps this aspect of power. Distinguishing total and relative power as two independent dimensions of power, Lawler and Yoon (1996) indicate that a structurally-cohesive relationship occurs under high total power and low relative (unequal) power. They found that structural cohesion in exchange relations promotes relational cohesion and behavioral commitment.
Among the standard exchange theory explanations for relationship development is that certain power-dependence conditions in exchange relations promote frequent exchange with the same actors (Emerson, 1972; Lawler, Thye, Yoon, 2000). When actors repeatedly exchange resources, they learn more about one another, find each other more predictable, and infer that they have similar orientations to the exchange task. Predictability, expectation confirmation and reduced transaction costs are considered as benefits of staying with the same actor (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1981; Molm, 1994; Molm and Cook, 1995). Research in cognitive psychology explains this in terms of uncertainty aversion, wherein individuals tend to avoid unpredictable or uncertain decision contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
This same theme emerges in a variety of other commitment explanations, ranging from those centered on trust (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) or relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1981) to those dealing with embeddedness within larger social units (Granovetter, 1985). Taken as a whole, these theories generally agree that reduced uncertainty sets the focal relation or group apart from others and inclines actors to perceive greater instrumental value in focal relations or groups. Relational cohesion theory questions this instrumental explanation of commitment in exchange theories. First, the instrumental foundation assumed by exchange theorists explains only one class or form of commitment, i.e., instrumental commitment in Kanter’s (1968) term. This instrumental explanation is analogous to an explanation of transactions in a grand spot market in which ties do form to realize instrumental incentives embedded in the relations. A problem is that it does not explain why actors remain in such relations in the face of better alternatives, competitive bidding and changing incentives in the environment (Frank, 1988, 1993; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, 2000). Rational choice theories and network exchange theories have also attempted to resolve the same problem by embedding a variety of incentive configurations in social structures. They assume that, once optimal incentive structures for multiple actors are configured and imposed exogenously on a given social relation or structure, actors would actualize them. The identities of those who carry the incentive structure do not matter because neither barriers nor coordination problems are assumed in realizing potential incentive structures (Hardin, 1968; Hechter, 1987; Macy, 1993: Yamagishi, 1995). In brief, the instrumental explanations proffered by both rational choice and network exchange theories treat human beings as cognitive calculators and their actions as reflections of the incentives embedded in structures. In contrast, RCT acknowledges explicitly that human beings have both emotive and cognitive capacities. RCT also proposes that social structures or relations have both enabling and constraining effects on actors (see also Giddens, 1984); this aspect of social structure or relations provides actors with opportunities to experience certain emotions and cognitions; they actively construct and reconstruct reality based on these emotional and cognitive experiences. Like instrumental explanations, RCT treats social structures or relations as exogenous conditions. However, RCT expands the instrumentally oriented approaches by emphasizing the process of emotional experience triggered by human agency. The theory implicitly assumes that human beings as voluntary agents interpret a given structure and use the experience of emotions in actively interpreting and reconstructing their own experience. This emphasis of RCT on emotions, cognition, and agency in explaining commitment dovetails with Coleman’s (1990) framework and, Collins’s (1981) interaction ritual chains. Coleman advocates the use of micro-order theories for explicating how human beings exploit or explore given structures and recreate new structures through rationally driven human agency. Collins (1981) also explains how actors experience emotional uplift through encounters and how these emotions help actors create solidarity.
In sum, RCT focuses on emotional experiences and cognitive work in human agency and the role they play in transforming a purely instrumental relationship into an expressive one.
A core idea in RCT is that social exchange has emotional as well as instrumental effects on actors and, if these are attributed to social units, then social units take on expressive value or intrinsic worth. Persons develop stronger ties to groups that are perceived as sources of positive feeling or emotion and weaker ties to those perceived as sources of negative feeling or emotion. These ties are instrumental to the degree that they reflect the benefits of mutually satisfactory exchange; they are expressive to the degree that the social unit becomes a distinct object of affective attachment. In this manner, RCT shows how emotions transform an instrumental relation into an affective object (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998) which contains three foundational ideas (Thye, Yoon, Lawler, 2002). First, exchange structures shape who is likely to interact and exchange with whom, by providing incentives for actors to exchange with some potential partners and not others (Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995). The same actors are likely to exchange with each other across time under fixed structural exchange conditions. Second, successful exchange efforts produce an emotional buzz, i.e., mild, positive feelings; failure to accomplish exchange generates mild negative feelings (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The emotions of concern here are involuntary and internal events that simply “happen to people” (Hochschild 1983). Parallel to this emotional process, successful exchanges also reduce uncertainties in the relation and strengthen the boundary between focal and alternative relations; this uncertainty reduction also reduces transaction costs in the focal relation and builds a foundation of trust (Williamson 1981; Kollock, 1994). Third, actors are motivated to understand the sources of these feelings because they want to reproduce good feelings and avoid bad feelings in the future. This stimulates cognitive work in which they are likely to identify social units—exchange relations or groups—in explaining their emotions. The emerging boundary between focal actors delineated by uncertainty reduction facilitates the actors’ attributions by making the sources of positive emotions salient (Lawler, 1992a). Thus, the relation to the group becomes an object of attachment in virtue of being perceived as a source of positive individual feelings. Cohesion and commitment are a result of this. The goal is to explicate the development of commitment in a group of multiple actors or members. The exogenous conditions are the structural relations of power dependence or interdependence among the actors (Emerson 1981; Molm 1994). Power is defined in terms of dependence, and as a structural capability distinct from both its use (tactics or strategies) and the actual or realized power resulting in the division of payoffs (Emerson 1972, Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992b; Molm 1990). Given a group of multiple actors, each actor’s dependence on the group is equal to the maximum benefit from the focal group compared with the maximum benefit from an alternative group. The total dependence in the group refers to the average of each member’s individual dependence on the group. Dependence equality/inequality refers to relative differences in degrees of dependence on the group among its members. RCT predicts that greater total dependence and equal dependence will produce more frequent and successful exchange in the focal group. Higher total dependence reduces the opportunity costs of opting for an alternative group; it also gives members greater adaptive flexibility in negotiations and more room for misperception or miscalculation. This is because under higher dependence there is a wider range of agreements that meet a “sufficiency” criterion, i.e., provide each actor more than the expected value from the alternative group. Dependence inequality impacts negotiations negatively because inequalities of power raise issues of fairness and legitimacy that are unlikely to arise under dependence equality (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996). The theory posits an interaction effect, predicting that the combination of high total and equal dependence on the group should produce an extra structural push toward repetitive exchange and the resulting group formation (i.e., commitment) process. This structural cohesion effect is similar to Kollock’s (1994) notion of running a “loose accounting system” in uncertain transactions; a higher total dependence allows partners to reach agreement at a wider range of prices at an earlier stage and equal dependence allows them to rectify imbalance in payoffs later, given repeated transactions. The theory posits an indirect sequence by which structural power-dependence conditions promote group formation. It starts with the exchange frequencies produced by the structure of dependence. One endogenous path operates through the uncertainty reduction effects of exchange frequency, and the second endogenous path operates through its emotional-affective effects. Uncertainty reduction is a “boundary-defining” process in which actors come to see the group to which they belong as setting them off from other relations or groups, i.e., as having distinctiveness in social identity terms (Brewer 1993). The emotional effects of exchange are described in terms of a “social bonding” process through which the group becomes an object of intrinsic or expressive value (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Although the two endogenous processes are analytically and empirically independent, they converge in that each enhances perceptions that the group is a unifying or cohesive unit (see also Bollen and Hoyle 1990). This occurs because actors seek to interpret the source of positive emotions and the emerging group boundary prompts them to attribute the positive emotions to the group; the attribution, emotional buzz, and salient boundary together induce actors to perceive their relationships to the group as having their own relational value (i.e., relational cohesion). RCT predicts that perceived relational cohesion among actors is the proximal cause of various forms of commitment behavior. RCT has tested this prediction by treating stay behavior, token gifts, and contribution to a joint venture as forms of commitment behavior. Stay behavior is a standard indicator of commitment in the literature and measures the degree to which actors remain in the focal relation in face of better or at least equal alternatives (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, 1998). Token gifts are defined as the giving of resources to others in a unilateral way with no strings attached. Defined in this way, token gifts lack instrumental value and are symbolic of a shared group affiliation (Lawler, Yoon, Baker, & Large, 1995). The theory takes the new joint venture as the form of an N-person social dilemma where noncontributing is the dominant strategy and the well-known disparity between individual and collective rationality is present (Axelrod 1984; Platt 1973). Among the three, stay behavior in the face of better alternatives can be construed as more instrumental than the others, gift giving as more expressive, and contribution behavior as more normative. The conditions and the processes in RCT have been tested by setting up a series of experiments in which these commitment behaviors are observed after actors have had the opportunity to establish a sense of relational cohesion through frequent or repetitive exchange (See Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; 1998; Lawler, Yoon, Baker, and Large 1995; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, 2000). RCT suggests that, given a group of multiple actors engaging in productive exchange, 2 members’ greater total dependence or equality of dependence on the group promote member-to-group commitments, indirectly through the following steps: (1) High total dependence and equal dependencies generate more frequent, successful exchange among members. (2) More frequent exchange among these members increases (a) positive emotions or feelings and (b) the perceived predictability of the other members (uncertainty reduction). (3) Positive emotions and perceptions of predictability each make the relation more salient as a unifying, cohesive object in the situation. (4) Greater perceived cohesion produces a stronger commitment to a group, as reflected in stay behavior, gift giving among members, and inclinations to undertake investments under risk or the potential for malfeasance (Lawler & Yoon, 1996; Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2000).
The relational cohesion model of organizational commitment is a direct application to organizational contexts. Following Parsons’ (1951) and Kanter’s (1968) distinctions, the model stipulates that an individual attachment can be instrumental (utilitarian), affective (emotional), or normative (moral). Instrumental commitment (IC) is based on the perceived benefits of remaining or complying with an organization, whereas affective commitment is based on an emotional or attachment to the organization. Normative commitment is the attachment to the moral values of an organization (Kanter, 1968). Meyer et al. (Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990) explicate the three dimensions with reference to the motivation underlying stay behavior. In an employment relationship, employees with instrumental commitment stay with an organization “because they need to;” those with affective commitment stay “because they want to;” and those with normative commitment stay “because they feel they ought to” (Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990). O’Reilly and Chatman (1986) also propose a similar typology of psychological attachment (i.e., compliance, identification, and internalization), with each equivalent respectively to the dimensions of instrumental, affective, and normative commitment.
Most scholars employing multiple dimensions of organizational commitment agree that high organizational performance can be attained through an organization’s capacity to mobilize more than instrumental commitment from its members (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Most studies of organizational commitment have investigated these three dimensions of commitment synchronically (Mathieu, 1991; Williams & Hazer, 1986), focusing on differential causes of the three dimensions of commitment and differential consequences for organizations. Employees enter their membership organizations with instrumental motivations: There is an exchange with an organization, within which individual members invest their human resources in the organization in anticipation of salary, fringe benefits, social networks, and reputation. There are various forms of organizational capital that members depend on in exchange with organizations and the initial effects of these on instrumental commitment. Affective commitment generates normative commitment based on special forms of cultural capital in an organization: Organizational Capital, Dependence, and Instrumental Commitment that instrumentally motivated members experience varying degrees of dependence that are determined by the benefits they enjoy from organizational capital (e.g., cultural capital, social capital, and human capital development resources).
Human capital is defined as a combination of an individual employee’s sets of knowledge, skills, expertise, experiences, and abilities (Becker, 1964); human capital is applied to their jobs and projects to generate value for the membership organization that pays for its market value. Social capital is the network of relations employees rely on to secure some of other benefits (Portes, 1998). Employees consume social capital for an instrumental purpose, perhaps to do their jobs more effectively by acquiring information or skills from other experts in the network. Cultural capital is a set of cultural resources that help members derive shared understanding, justifications, and interpretations of organizational events and routines (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Rentsch, 1990; Schein, 1985). Employees rely on cultural capital as a kind of mental map, guiding appropriate ways of being and doing in organizational contexts (Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978; James & James, 1989; Schneider, 1975; Senge, 1990; Swidler, 1986). Cultural capital also encompasses an organization’s reputation, its performance expectations, and its status in a given industry.
As members perceive greater dependence on an organization in terms of the total benefits that derive from the organizational capital, they are likely to show greater instrumental commitment (IC) to that organization. Our model assumes that employees put their human capital and effort to their membership organization with an instrumental motive, i.e., to achieve their personal goals. Among the most prominent goals individual members have in mind in the twenty- first century is to increase the value or marketability of their human capital in the internal and external labor markets. Employees also expect that their membership organizations become instrumental in making their careers resistant to threats posed by unstable economic conditions (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Schalk, 2000). An acquisition of excellent human capital also serves an instrumental purpose to most organizations, because organizations use it as a central strategic factor in gaining their competitive advantages (Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Wright & Snell, 1998; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Pfeffer, 1994). An investment in human capital via education and training can generate a positive return on their investment (Becker, 1964). Becker distinguishes between specific and general human capital investments: specific human capital investment refers to skills or knowledge that is useful only to one or a few employers, whereas general human capital investment is useful to all employers.
Organizations and their employees share the goal of increasing the return on such investments in hired or their own human capital respectively. However, employees want to increase the market value of their own human capital by investing more in general human capital, because such an investment reduces dependence on current employers; in contrast, employers want to invest in company- specific human capital, because such investment protects its return and makes employees dependent. To the extent that an employee perceives that the total benefits in compensation for his or her current forms of human capital are greater than those to be expected from alternative employers, the employee will experience greater dependence on the employing organization. In addition to an organization’s human capital investment, members also become dependent on the social capital their company provides. Social capital in the form of resources embedded in networks of relations is framed by each individual’s interest in the capital. With this aspect in mind, Portes describes it as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or relationships in social structures” (Portes, 1998, p. 6).
Social capital is not an individual actor’s property; its value resides in the relationship, which makes it more like a public good, especially when it is deployed within a collective boundary or a closed network (Coleman, 1988). It is because social capital requires a minimum level of mutual effort for the maintenance of commitment, trust, support, and cooperation. Harvesting the benefits without contributions erodes other members’ good will and seriously depletes capital funds. Members’ social capital can be based on either internal or external ties (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Social capital in the form of external ties functions as a bridge that brings resources into an organization from other groups or networks outside the organization (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973), whereas social capital in the form of internal ties functions as a communal bonding or sharing mechanism over individual resources within the boundary of a collectivity (Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1988).
Despite this significant role, the dependence of individual members on this form of capital is largely implicit. Employees might not perceive its explicit value until they decide to leave an organization and search for a new organization. In part, the value of social capital is implicit—there is no common metric available to measure social relations as there is in the case of economic capital. Nevertheless, when a member who has long benefited from a strong relationship with internal members seeks to move elsewhere, his or her dependence on social capital can emerge as an important factor. Similarly, when a member as a representative of an organization has also been benefited from social net works with representatives of other organizations, such dependence also might come to the foreground. As in specific human capital, as the organization produces more non transferable social capital, an employee becomes more dependent on this organization’s social capital. The model in Figure 2 also predicts that employees develop dependence on cultural capital. In this context, much research indicates how cultural capital affects various organizational activities and behavior, such as organization-person fit (O’Reilly and Caldwell, 1981; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Chatman, 1989), organizational learning (Senge, 1990; Nadkarni, 2003), and organizational transformation (Collins and Porras, 1996).
Like of social capital, cultural capital is so deeply ingrained in members’ mental maps that they might not recognize their dependence on it. Instrumental dependence on cultural capital produced by the organization emerges instead from other forms of cultural capital: the status of an organization in its industry is an example of this. An organization’s industry status is one of its cultural assets or resources, because organizational status is activated by cultural beliefs shared among all organizations in the industry. Especially when evaluators in the labor market have no information on a given individual, they infer the status value and performance expectation of that individual from his or her membership organization’s status and performance expectation. Organizational status is carried over in determining members’ status in the market. Higher organizational status also becomes a source of pride for members that differ from the respect that results from an individual’s status within an organization (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Tyler, 2001). Other things being equal, the higher the status and performance expectation of an organization within an industry, the greater is its members’ dependence on this aspect of cultural capital.
Most job candidates also have this status information in mind when they search prospective membership organizations. Employees develop instrumental commitment by the degree to which they consumes organizational capital in the form of human capital investment (e.g., training and education), social capital (e.g., social support and relationships), and cultural capital (e.g., organizational reputation). The instrumental commitment in turn brings employees into compliance with the organization’s operational rules and induces them to stay with that organization. Stay and compliance are two behavioral indicators of instrumental commitment (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Endogenous Processes and Affective Commitment
Experience of empowerment is equivalent to repetitive exchange as a joint accomplishment; perceived membership support is equivalent to predictability or reduced uncertainty; and positive work emotions are equivalent to positive emotions. In parallel with these two endogenous processes the relational cohesion model of organizational commitment proposes that a member’s experience of empowerment triggers two pathways (emotional bonding and boundary defining) to sense of unity and affective commitment. An organization’s dependence on its members is a moderating factor in transforming the member’s perception of dependence into the experience of empowerment state.
Empowerment refers to a state in which employees experience enhanced efficacy or sense of control in achieving personal goals in their organization (Yoon, 2001; Bandura, 1982). This notion of empowerment dovetails with Conger and Kanungo’s (1988) conceptualization as a motivational process whereby an individual’s belief in his or her self-efficacy is enhanced in executing desired behavior (also see Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). An organization’s dependence added to an employee’s own dependence provides the employee with empowerment experience, because the resulting mutual dependence helps each other adjust their goals in a mutually beneficial manner, which in turn enhances the chance to achieve those goals over the long run. Lawler (1986) calls a bundle of empowerment practices built upon this idea of mutual dependence high performance work systems. Tsui and her associates (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997) confirm that perceived mutual dependence in the employment relationship enhances employees’ commitments, organizational citizenship behavior as well as performance.
Perceived membership support refers to individual members’ beliefs that an organization will treat them as deserving members when the organization is under uncertainty, risk, or financial difficulties, or when the members make mistakes or suffer from poor performances. As employees perceive greater membership support in such situations, they are likely to experience greater certainty or predictability in the future of the relationship. Perceived membership support is similar to Eisenberger and others’ (Eisenberger, Hutington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002; Tyler, 2001) notion of perceived organizational support (POS) in that POS also taps members’ beliefs in their organization’s expected positive response to future mishaps. Yet, perceived membership support is more specific on membership belief, while POS emphasizes general organizational support such as an organization’s appreciation of individual members’ contributions, consideration of members’ personal values, and its caring about their well-being and opinions.
It is expected that empowered employees are likely to perform better and, given these contributions, be accepted as more deserving members by an organization. In a similar context, Hollander (1958) also indicates that members’ repeated contributions can be saved as idiosyncratic credits that can be used to draw membership support, especially when they make unexpected mistakes, perform poorly, or fail at specific tasks. Idiosyncratic credits make it possible for members to manage their member-organization relationships based on loose accounting systems (Kollock, 1994). Emotion is defined as a relatively short-lived positive or negative affective state resulting from an appraisal of experiences or events (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996).
Two facets of positive emotions: pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement are considered (Izard, 1977; Watson and Tellegen, 1985; Larsen and Diener, 1992). Pleasure/satisfaction is “feeling gratified,” and interest/excitement is “feeling energized.” Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996) describe interest/excitement as a forward-looking emotion, one based on an awareness of potential satisfaction in anticipation of possible gains, and pleasure/satisfaction as a backward-looking emotion, which occurs after something has been gained. Assuming partners in an exchange relation simultaneously look forward and backward, the relational cohesion theory explores whether the corresponding emotions mediate commitment behavior. Following this lead, we construe positive work emotion as a positively gratified or energized state resulting from the appraisal of one’s work experience.
Rediscovering different types of affect in the workplace in the mid-1980s and 1990s, organizational researchers have argued that job satisfaction is limited in understanding various affective work experiences because its measurement captures mainly evaluative and cognitive states rather than affective ones (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Researchers address this problem by incorporating interest/excitement as another key affective state and treating pleasure/satisfaction as a global emotion beyond specific job evaluation. As a motivating state of curiosity and fascination (Izard, 1977), interest/excitement captures more active aspects of affective experiences. When employees experience more empowering achievements through work and organizational activities, they tend to be emotionally aroused and gratified and they attribute the positive emotions to the relationship.
The positive work emotions triggered by empowerment experience constitute internal reinforcing stimuli for employees; employees who want to produce positive work emotions try to understand their sources; enhanced mutual dependence with their organization makes employees attribute their emotions to the relationship with the organization (Lawler, 2001, 2002). The emerging membership boundary with perceived membership support also prompts members to interpret the sources of their positive emotions and attribute them to the member-organization relationship itself. As members begin to perceive such a relationship as an emotionally and cognitively binding force, the relationship becomes objectified as a valuable third force unifying them with the organization.
The instrumental commitment develops into affective commitment when employees perceive a sense of unity with their membership organization. Validation and Normative Commitment We conceptualize instrumental commitment as an attachment to the utilitarian value of an organization and affective commitment as an attachment to the relational value with an organization. Similarly, normative commitment is defined as an attachment to the moral value for an organization. This definition of normative commitment is similar to Buchanan’s (1974) definition. Buchanan construes commitment in terms of an attachment to the long-term goals (or visions) and values of an organization. Weiner’s (1982) normative commitment is seen as personal convictions to the value system (e.g., missions and goals) of an organization. Weiner (1982) differentiates this form of normative commitment from the conventional normative commitment built upon generalized loyalty and duty. The conventional normative commitment requires members to be blindly loyal to the organization, where as normative commitment as personal convictions permits individual choice among distinctive value systems and initiatives to realize the chosen one (Weiner, 1982). The moral value of an organization as a target of normative commitment is determined by the cultural capital the organization holds.
Another researcher has defined normative commitment as members’ attachments to the moral value of their membership that proposes a mechanism though which affective attachment generates normative attachment. This mechanism requires a series of cognitive and evaluative work (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Wiener, 2001): First, members attempt to make broad sense of the relational value of affective attachment. Second, once a proper moral meaning of the relationship to an organization is primed then members begin to perceive an incipient moral value of the organization. Finally, members develop normative attachment to the organization, when they realize that the organizational values are also congruent with their personal values so that they begin to identify with it.
Once members develop normative commitment to their organization, they use the set of organizational mental models (i.e., visions, purposes, and values) more deliberatively in justifying and legitimating critical events in their organization. In particular, decisions members reach are guided more explicitly by the core values an organization holds (Barrett, 2003). Members incorporate corporate visions, values, and missions in articulating their own personal mental models (Levin, 2000). This infusion of a corporate mental model into members’ mental models in turn drives members’ greater engagement in realizing it by putting substantial effort and sacrifice into action.
Despite several powerful explanatory advantages, normative commitment has not drawn much research attention to date (Weiner, 2001) One reason is that normative commitment is conceptualized vaguely in terms of blind moral judgment and attitudes, which makes scientific scrutiny of its theoretical commitments difficult. Our model addresses this problem clearly by defining normative commitment as attachment to the moral value of a corporate mental model. Another reason is that some organizations may not yet have established their salient mental models as a foundation for normative commitment.
Recently scholars have begun to recognize the importance of normative commitment in understanding more dynamic aspects of organizational activities beyond performance and order (Collins and Porras, 1996; Kirkpatrick, Wlfford, & Baum, 2002; Kotter, 1996; Larwood, Fable, Kriger, & Miesing, 1995; Wiener, 1982). Along with this developmental focus, various behaviors as reflections of these underlying dimensions of attachment are identified. For example, compliance, turnover, and intention to stay are among the main behavioral indicators of instrumental commitment (Mathieu, 1991; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Williams & Hazer, 1986). Thus, organizational citizenship behavior can be construed as a behavioral indication of affective attachment (Organ, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000); and substantial contributions and sacrifice are a behavioral expression of normative commitment (Weiner, 1982).
When such affective and normative commitment behaviors are collectively expressed among members, they lay the foundations of ritualization and legitimation for an organization. Specifically, the collective behavioral expression of affective commitment through extra role behavior or organizational citizenship behavior constitutes organizational rituals invoking a shared membership identity and its affective value for all members (Durkheim, 1915). Similarly, the collective behavioral expression of sacrifices and significant contributions among members becomes a strong source of validity for those members who seek an endorsement of their personal propriety beliefs from other members (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Scott, 1987; Walker et al., 1986).
Furthermore, the collectively validated organizational mental model works as a guiding principle legitimizing the current organizational establishment of structure and process. In contrast with the principle of aggregation by rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990), ritualization and legitimation provide alternative principles explaining how individual actions are organized at the collective level.
Normative commitment’s definition has changed since its inception (Allen, 2003). The original 1990 normative commitment scale was designed to capture normative commitment as based on Weiner’s (1982) work on the internalization of social loyalty norms to organizations. In 1993, normative commitment was re-conceptualized as an obligation to stay with the organization, without specific reference to social pressures about loyalty (Meyer et al., 1993). This conceptual shift was built in to the revised 1993 normative commitment scale. However, recently, normative commitment scale has been altered yet again, to reflect reciprocity for a benefit (Meyer et al., 2002). Still more recently, Meyer, Becker, & Van Dick (2006) refined this new reciprocity theme further, positing a two-dimensional concept of normative commitment: an "indebted obligation" aspect that reflects the perceived need to meet other's expectations, which is theorized to be correlated with continuance commitment; and a "moral imperative" aspect that reflects striving to meet valued outcomes, which is theorized to be correlated with affective commitment. Thus, the current normative commitment scale, which hasn't been revised since 1993, has not been modified to keep up with the recent conceptual revisions, and thus probably does not adequately reflect the theorized construct, which now bears a strong resemblance to social-exchange based constructs such as the psychological contract (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1995). Powell & Meyer (2004) found that contrary to expectations, social-cost side bets predicted normative commitment stronger than continuance commitment, and speculated that normative commitment might be a "special form" of continuance commitment. This idea has face validity, since an "obligation to remain" with the organization, particularly one based on reciprocity, could very well be experienced by the employee as a psychic "cost", in the form of a guilty conscience, that would have to be incurred if the employee were to break the obligation and leave. Similarly, Wasti (2003), in noting that Becker's original continuance commitment theory contemplated "generalized cultural expectations" about remaining as an antecedent, says that "Becker has in effect proposed that continuance commitment does not develop from calculative costs only, but has normative bases as well". This further confounds the issue of the discriminant validity of the normative commitment scale as measuring a distinct form of commitment. Clearly, additional empirical work, using a revised normative commitment scale that comports with the latest conceptualization, is needed to address whether normative commitment really is a form of commitment, or an antecedent of commitment.
Some researchers reviewed the relational cohesion theory to develop a model of organizational commitment. The relational cohesion theory is based on the belief that social exchange is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It occurs in neighbors’ exchanges of favors, peers’ exchanges of assistance, friends’ exchanges of gifts, scholars’ exchanges of research ideas, and even spouses of partners’ exchanges of affection. A common principle underlying these exchanges is reciprocal obligation (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). If one asks a friend a favor, this entails a general expectation of future return. This aspect of reciprocal obligation differentiates social exchange from economic transactions. While the lack of reciprocity makes each economic transaction discrete and independent, the reciprocity principle in social exchange entails repetition and obligations in future interaction. Consummating a social exchange necessarily builds up feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust among partners, all of which lays a foundation of social solidarity and micro social order even without binding contracts. Social exchange theory emphasizes the structural context of transactions in which two or more actors seek to arrive at a satisfactory exchange of benefits. The context of a relationship is structured by repeated opportunities for social transactions among the same actors (Emerson, 1981).
The structural cohesion in exchange relations promotes relational cohesion and behavioral commitment. Among the standard exchange theory explanations for relationship development is that certain power-dependence conditions in exchange relations promote frequent exchange with the same actors (Emerson, 1972; Lawler, The, Yoon, 2000). Expectation confirmation and reduced transaction costs are considered as benefits of staying with the same actor (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1981; Molm, 1994; Molm and Cook, 1995). Research in cognitive psychology explains this in terms of uncertainty aversion, wherein individuals tend to avoid uncertain decision contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This same theme emerges in a variety of other commitment explanations, ranging from those centered on trust (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) or relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1981) to those dealing with embeddedness within larger social units (Granovetter, 1985).
Taken as a whole, these theories generally agree that reduced uncertainty sets the focal relation or group apart from others and inclines actors to perceive greater instrumental value in focal relations or groups. Rational choice theories and network exchange theories have also attempted to resolve the same problem by embedding a variety of incentive configurations in social structures. They assume that, once optimal incentive structures for multiple actors are configured and imposed exogenously on a given social relation or structure, actors would actualize them. The identities of those who carry the incentive structure do not matter because neither barriers nor coordination problems are assumed in realizing potential incentive structures (Hardin, 1968; Hechter, 1987; Macy, 1993: Yamagishi, 1995).
Social exchange is a ubiquitous phenomenon. It occurs in neighbors’ exchanges of favors, peers’ exchanges of assistance, friends’ exchanges of gifts, scholars’ exchanges of research ideas, and even spouses of partners’ exchanges of affection. A common principle underlying these exchanges is reciprocal obligation (Gouldner, 1960; Blau, 1964). Emerson’s (1972, 1981) exchange theory provides a breakthrough in analyzing the enduring exchange relation in terms of power and dependence. Emerson (1972) identifies this as a “cohesion effect” of mutual power, and Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) notion of mutual-fate control also taps this aspect of power. Distinguishing total and relative power as two independent dimensions of power, Lawler and Yoon (1996) indicate that a structurally-cohesive relationship occurs under high total power and low relative (unequal) power. They found that structural cohesion in exchange relations promotes relational cohesion and behavioral commitment.
Among the standard exchange theory explanations for relationship development is that certain power-dependence conditions in exchange relations promote frequent exchange with the same actors (Emerson, 1972; Lawler, Thye, Yoon, 2000). When actors repeatedly exchange resources, they learn more about one another, find each other more predictable, and infer that they have similar orientations to the exchange task. Predictability, expectation confirmation and reduced transaction costs are considered as benefits of staying with the same actor (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1981; Molm, 1994; Molm and Cook, 1995). Research in cognitive psychology explains this in terms of uncertainty aversion, wherein individuals tend to avoid unpredictable or uncertain decision contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
This same theme emerges in a variety of other commitment explanations, ranging from those centered on trust (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) or relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1981) to those dealing with embeddedness within larger social units (Granovetter, 1985). Taken as a whole, these theories generally agree that reduced uncertainty sets the focal relation or group apart from others and inclines actors to perceive greater instrumental value in focal relations or groups. Relational cohesion theory questions this instrumental explanation of commitment in exchange theories. First, the instrumental foundation assumed by exchange theorists explains only one class or form of commitment, i.e., instrumental commitment in Kanter’s (1968) term. This instrumental explanation is analogous to an explanation of transactions in a grand spot market in which ties do form to realize instrumental incentives embedded in the relations. A problem is that it does not explain why actors remain in such relations in the face of better alternatives, competitive bidding and changing incentives in the environment (Frank, 1988, 1993; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, 2000). Rational choice theories and network exchange theories have also attempted to resolve the same problem by embedding a variety of incentive configurations in social structures. They assume that, once optimal incentive structures for multiple actors are configured and imposed exogenously on a given social relation or structure, actors would actualize them. The identities of those who carry the incentive structure do not matter because neither barriers nor coordination problems are assumed in realizing potential incentive structures (Hardin, 1968; Hechter, 1987; Macy, 1993: Yamagishi, 1995). In brief, the instrumental explanations proffered by both rational choice and network exchange theories treat human beings as cognitive calculators and their actions as reflections of the incentives embedded in structures. In contrast, RCT acknowledges explicitly that human beings have both emotive and cognitive capacities. RCT also proposes that social structures or relations have both enabling and constraining effects on actors (see also Giddens, 1984); this aspect of social structure or relations provides actors with opportunities to experience certain emotions and cognitions; they actively construct and reconstruct reality based on these emotional and cognitive experiences. Like instrumental explanations, RCT treats social structures or relations as exogenous conditions. However, RCT expands the instrumentally oriented approaches by emphasizing the process of emotional experience triggered by human agency. The theory implicitly assumes that human beings as voluntary agents interpret a given structure and use the experience of emotions in actively interpreting and reconstructing their own experience. This emphasis of RCT on emotions, cognition, and agency in explaining commitment dovetails with Coleman’s (1990) framework and, Collins’s (1981) interaction ritual chains. Coleman advocates the use of micro-order theories for explicating how human beings exploit or explore given structures and recreate new structures through rationally driven human agency. Collins (1981) also explains how actors experience emotional uplift through encounters and how these emotions help actors create solidarity.
In sum, RCT focuses on emotional experiences and cognitive work in human agency and the role they play in transforming a purely instrumental relationship into an expressive one.
A core idea in RCT is that social exchange has emotional as well as instrumental effects on actors and, if these are attributed to social units, then social units take on expressive value or intrinsic worth. Persons develop stronger ties to groups that are perceived as sources of positive feeling or emotion and weaker ties to those perceived as sources of negative feeling or emotion. These ties are instrumental to the degree that they reflect the benefits of mutually satisfactory exchange; they are expressive to the degree that the social unit becomes a distinct object of affective attachment. In this manner, RCT shows how emotions transform an instrumental relation into an affective object (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998) which contains three foundational ideas (Thye, Yoon, Lawler, 2002). First, exchange structures shape who is likely to interact and exchange with whom, by providing incentives for actors to exchange with some potential partners and not others (Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995). The same actors are likely to exchange with each other across time under fixed structural exchange conditions. Second, successful exchange efforts produce an emotional buzz, i.e., mild, positive feelings; failure to accomplish exchange generates mild negative feelings (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The emotions of concern here are involuntary and internal events that simply “happen to people” (Hochschild 1983). Parallel to this emotional process, successful exchanges also reduce uncertainties in the relation and strengthen the boundary between focal and alternative relations; this uncertainty reduction also reduces transaction costs in the focal relation and builds a foundation of trust (Williamson 1981; Kollock, 1994). Third, actors are motivated to understand the sources of these feelings because they want to reproduce good feelings and avoid bad feelings in the future. This stimulates cognitive work in which they are likely to identify social units—exchange relations or groups—in explaining their emotions. The emerging boundary between focal actors delineated by uncertainty reduction facilitates the actors’ attributions by making the sources of positive emotions salient (Lawler, 1992a). Thus, the relation to the group becomes an object of attachment in virtue of being perceived as a source of positive individual feelings. Cohesion and commitment are a result of this. The goal is to explicate the development of commitment in a group of multiple actors or members. The exogenous conditions are the structural relations of power dependence or interdependence among the actors (Emerson 1981; Molm 1994). Power is defined in terms of dependence, and as a structural capability distinct from both its use (tactics or strategies) and the actual or realized power resulting in the division of payoffs (Emerson 1972, Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992b; Molm 1990). Given a group of multiple actors, each actor’s dependence on the group is equal to the maximum benefit from the focal group compared with the maximum benefit from an alternative group. The total dependence in the group refers to the average of each member’s individual dependence on the group. Dependence equality/inequality refers to relative differences in degrees of dependence on the group among its members. RCT predicts that greater total dependence and equal dependence will produce more frequent and successful exchange in the focal group. Higher total dependence reduces the opportunity costs of opting for an alternative group; it also gives members greater adaptive flexibility in negotiations and more room for misperception or miscalculation. This is because under higher dependence there is a wider range of agreements that meet a “sufficiency” criterion, i.e., provide each actor more than the expected value from the alternative group. Dependence inequality impacts negotiations negatively because inequalities of power raise issues of fairness and legitimacy that are unlikely to arise under dependence equality (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996). The theory posits an interaction effect, predicting that the combination of high total and equal dependence on the group should produce an extra structural push toward repetitive exchange and the resulting group formation (i.e., commitment) process. This structural cohesion effect is similar to Kollock’s (1994) notion of running a “loose accounting system” in uncertain transactions; a higher total dependence allows partners to reach agreement at a wider range of prices at an earlier stage and equal dependence allows them to rectify imbalance in payoffs later, given repeated transactions. The theory posits an indirect sequence by which structural power-dependence conditions promote group formation. It starts with the exchange frequencies produced by the structure of dependence. One endogenous path operates through the uncertainty reduction effects of exchange frequency, and the second endogenous path operates through its emotional-affective effects. Uncertainty reduction is a “boundary-defining” process in which actors come to see the group to which they belong as setting them off from other relations or groups, i.e., as having distinctiveness in social identity terms (Brewer 1993). The emotional effects of exchange are described in terms of a “social bonding” process through which the group becomes an object of intrinsic or expressive value (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Although the two endogenous processes are analytically and empirically independent, they converge in that each enhances perceptions that the group is a unifying or cohesive unit (see also Bollen and Hoyle 1990). This occurs because actors seek to interpret the source of positive emotions and the emerging group boundary prompts them to attribute the positive emotions to the group; the attribution, emotional buzz, and salient boundary together induce actors to perceive their relationships to the group as having their own relational value (i.e., relational cohesion). RCT predicts that perceived relational cohesion among actors is the proximal cause of various forms of commitment behavior. RCT has tested this prediction by treating stay behavior, token gifts, and contribution to a joint venture as forms of commitment behavior. Stay behavior is a standard indicator of commitment in the literature and measures the degree to which actors remain in the focal relation in face of better or at least equal alternatives (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, 1998). Token gifts are defined as the giving of resources to others in a unilateral way with no strings attached. Defined in this way, token gifts lack instrumental value and are symbolic of a shared group affiliation (Lawler, Yoon, Baker, & Large, 1995). The theory takes the new joint venture as the form of an N-person social dilemma where noncontributing is the dominant strategy and the well-known disparity between individual and collective rationality is present (Axelrod 1984; Platt 1973). Among the three, stay behavior in the face of better alternatives can be construed as more instrumental than the others, gift giving as more expressive, and contribution behavior as more normative. The conditions and the processes in RCT have been tested by setting up a series of experiments in which these commitment behaviors are observed after actors have had the opportunity to establish a sense of relational cohesion through frequent or repetitive exchange (See Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; 1998; Lawler, Yoon, Baker, and Large 1995; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, 2000). RCT suggests that, given a group of multiple actors engaging in productive exchange, 2 members’ greater total dependence or equality of dependence on the group promote member-to-group commitments, indirectly through the following steps: (1) High total dependence and equal dependencies generate more frequent, successful exchange among members. (2) More frequent exchange among these members increases (a) positive emotions or feelings and (b) the perceived predictability of the other members (uncertainty reduction). (3) Positive emotions and perceptions of predictability each make the relation more salient as a unifying, cohesive object in the situation. (4) Greater perceived cohesion produces a stronger commitment to a group, as reflected in stay behavior, gift giving among members, and inclinations to undertake investments under risk or the potential for malfeasance (Lawler & Yoon, 1996; Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2000).
The relational cohesion model of organizational commitment is a direct application to organizational contexts. Following Parsons’ (1951) and Kanter’s (1968) distinctions, the model stipulates that an individual attachment can be instrumental (utilitarian), affective (emotional), or normative (moral). Instrumental commitment (IC) is based on the perceived benefits of remaining or complying with an organization, whereas affective commitment is based on an emotional or attachment to the organization. Normative commitment is the attachment to the moral values of an organization (Kanter, 1968). Meyer et al. (Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990) explicate the three dimensions with reference to the motivation underlying stay behavior. In an employment relationship, employees with instrumental commitment stay with an organization “because they need to;” those with affective commitment stay “because they want to;” and those with normative commitment stay “because they feel they ought to” (Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990). O’Reilly and Chatman (1986) also propose a similar typology of psychological attachment (i.e., compliance, identification, and internalization), with each equivalent respectively to the dimensions of instrumental, affective, and normative commitment.
Most scholars employing multiple dimensions of organizational commitment agree that high organizational performance can be attained through an organization’s capacity to mobilize more than instrumental commitment from its members (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Meyer, Allen, and Gellatly, 1990; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Most studies of organizational commitment have investigated these three dimensions of commitment synchronically (Mathieu, 1991; Williams & Hazer, 1986), focusing on differential causes of the three dimensions of commitment and differential consequences for organizations. Employees enter their membership organizations with instrumental motivations: There is an exchange with an organization, within which individual members invest their human resources in the organization in anticipation of salary, fringe benefits, social networks, and reputation. There are various forms of organizational capital that members depend on in exchange with organizations and the initial effects of these on instrumental commitment. Affective commitment generates normative commitment based on special forms of cultural capital in an organization: Organizational Capital, Dependence, and Instrumental Commitment that instrumentally motivated members experience varying degrees of dependence that are determined by the benefits they enjoy from organizational capital (e.g., cultural capital, social capital, and human capital development resources).
Human capital is defined as a combination of an individual employee’s sets of knowledge, skills, expertise, experiences, and abilities (Becker, 1964); human capital is applied to their jobs and projects to generate value for the membership organization that pays for its market value. Social capital is the network of relations employees rely on to secure some of other benefits (Portes, 1998). Employees consume social capital for an instrumental purpose, perhaps to do their jobs more effectively by acquiring information or skills from other experts in the network. Cultural capital is a set of cultural resources that help members derive shared understanding, justifications, and interpretations of organizational events and routines (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Rentsch, 1990; Schein, 1985). Employees rely on cultural capital as a kind of mental map, guiding appropriate ways of being and doing in organizational contexts (Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978; James & James, 1989; Schneider, 1975; Senge, 1990; Swidler, 1986). Cultural capital also encompasses an organization’s reputation, its performance expectations, and its status in a given industry.
As members perceive greater dependence on an organization in terms of the total benefits that derive from the organizational capital, they are likely to show greater instrumental commitment (IC) to that organization. Our model assumes that employees put their human capital and effort to their membership organization with an instrumental motive, i.e., to achieve their personal goals. Among the most prominent goals individual members have in mind in the twenty- first century is to increase the value or marketability of their human capital in the internal and external labor markets. Employees also expect that their membership organizations become instrumental in making their careers resistant to threats posed by unstable economic conditions (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Schalk, 2000). An acquisition of excellent human capital also serves an instrumental purpose to most organizations, because organizations use it as a central strategic factor in gaining their competitive advantages (Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Wright & Snell, 1998; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Pfeffer, 1994). An investment in human capital via education and training can generate a positive return on their investment (Becker, 1964). Becker distinguishes between specific and general human capital investments: specific human capital investment refers to skills or knowledge that is useful only to one or a few employers, whereas general human capital investment is useful to all employers.
Organizations and their employees share the goal of increasing the return on such investments in hired or their own human capital respectively. However, employees want to increase the market value of their own human capital by investing more in general human capital, because such an investment reduces dependence on current employers; in contrast, employers want to invest in company- specific human capital, because such investment protects its return and makes employees dependent. To the extent that an employee perceives that the total benefits in compensation for his or her current forms of human capital are greater than those to be expected from alternative employers, the employee will experience greater dependence on the employing organization. In addition to an organization’s human capital investment, members also become dependent on the social capital their company provides. Social capital in the form of resources embedded in networks of relations is framed by each individual’s interest in the capital. With this aspect in mind, Portes describes it as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or relationships in social structures” (Portes, 1998, p. 6).
Social capital is not an individual actor’s property; its value resides in the relationship, which makes it more like a public good, especially when it is deployed within a collective boundary or a closed network (Coleman, 1988). It is because social capital requires a minimum level of mutual effort for the maintenance of commitment, trust, support, and cooperation. Harvesting the benefits without contributions erodes other members’ good will and seriously depletes capital funds. Members’ social capital can be based on either internal or external ties (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Social capital in the form of external ties functions as a bridge that brings resources into an organization from other groups or networks outside the organization (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973), whereas social capital in the form of internal ties functions as a communal bonding or sharing mechanism over individual resources within the boundary of a collectivity (Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1988).
Despite this significant role, the dependence of individual members on this form of capital is largely implicit. Employees might not perceive its explicit value until they decide to leave an organization and search for a new organization. In part, the value of social capital is implicit—there is no common metric available to measure social relations as there is in the case of economic capital. Nevertheless, when a member who has long benefited from a strong relationship with internal members seeks to move elsewhere, his or her dependence on social capital can emerge as an important factor. Similarly, when a member as a representative of an organization has also been benefited from social net works with representatives of other organizations, such dependence also might come to the foreground. As in specific human capital, as the organization produces more non transferable social capital, an employee becomes more dependent on this organization’s social capital. The model in Figure 2 also predicts that employees develop dependence on cultural capital. In this context, much research indicates how cultural capital affects various organizational activities and behavior, such as organization-person fit (O’Reilly and Caldwell, 1981; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Chatman, 1989), organizational learning (Senge, 1990; Nadkarni, 2003), and organizational transformation (Collins and Porras, 1996).
Like of social capital, cultural capital is so deeply ingrained in members’ mental maps that they might not recognize their dependence on it. Instrumental dependence on cultural capital produced by the organization emerges instead from other forms of cultural capital: the status of an organization in its industry is an example of this. An organization’s industry status is one of its cultural assets or resources, because organizational status is activated by cultural beliefs shared among all organizations in the industry. Especially when evaluators in the labor market have no information on a given individual, they infer the status value and performance expectation of that individual from his or her membership organization’s status and performance expectation. Organizational status is carried over in determining members’ status in the market. Higher organizational status also becomes a source of pride for members that differ from the respect that results from an individual’s status within an organization (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Tyler, 2001). Other things being equal, the higher the status and performance expectation of an organization within an industry, the greater is its members’ dependence on this aspect of cultural capital.
Most job candidates also have this status information in mind when they search prospective membership organizations. Employees develop instrumental commitment by the degree to which they consumes organizational capital in the form of human capital investment (e.g., training and education), social capital (e.g., social support and relationships), and cultural capital (e.g., organizational reputation). The instrumental commitment in turn brings employees into compliance with the organization’s operational rules and induces them to stay with that organization. Stay and compliance are two behavioral indicators of instrumental commitment (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Endogenous Processes and Affective Commitment
Experience of empowerment is equivalent to repetitive exchange as a joint accomplishment; perceived membership support is equivalent to predictability or reduced uncertainty; and positive work emotions are equivalent to positive emotions. In parallel with these two endogenous processes the relational cohesion model of organizational commitment proposes that a member’s experience of empowerment triggers two pathways (emotional bonding and boundary defining) to sense of unity and affective commitment. An organization’s dependence on its members is a moderating factor in transforming the member’s perception of dependence into the experience of empowerment state.
Empowerment refers to a state in which employees experience enhanced efficacy or sense of control in achieving personal goals in their organization (Yoon, 2001; Bandura, 1982). This notion of empowerment dovetails with Conger and Kanungo’s (1988) conceptualization as a motivational process whereby an individual’s belief in his or her self-efficacy is enhanced in executing desired behavior (also see Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). An organization’s dependence added to an employee’s own dependence provides the employee with empowerment experience, because the resulting mutual dependence helps each other adjust their goals in a mutually beneficial manner, which in turn enhances the chance to achieve those goals over the long run. Lawler (1986) calls a bundle of empowerment practices built upon this idea of mutual dependence high performance work systems. Tsui and her associates (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997) confirm that perceived mutual dependence in the employment relationship enhances employees’ commitments, organizational citizenship behavior as well as performance.
Perceived membership support refers to individual members’ beliefs that an organization will treat them as deserving members when the organization is under uncertainty, risk, or financial difficulties, or when the members make mistakes or suffer from poor performances. As employees perceive greater membership support in such situations, they are likely to experience greater certainty or predictability in the future of the relationship. Perceived membership support is similar to Eisenberger and others’ (Eisenberger, Hutington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002; Tyler, 2001) notion of perceived organizational support (POS) in that POS also taps members’ beliefs in their organization’s expected positive response to future mishaps. Yet, perceived membership support is more specific on membership belief, while POS emphasizes general organizational support such as an organization’s appreciation of individual members’ contributions, consideration of members’ personal values, and its caring about their well-being and opinions.
It is expected that empowered employees are likely to perform better and, given these contributions, be accepted as more deserving members by an organization. In a similar context, Hollander (1958) also indicates that members’ repeated contributions can be saved as idiosyncratic credits that can be used to draw membership support, especially when they make unexpected mistakes, perform poorly, or fail at specific tasks. Idiosyncratic credits make it possible for members to manage their member-organization relationships based on loose accounting systems (Kollock, 1994). Emotion is defined as a relatively short-lived positive or negative affective state resulting from an appraisal of experiences or events (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996).
Two facets of positive emotions: pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement are considered (Izard, 1977; Watson and Tellegen, 1985; Larsen and Diener, 1992). Pleasure/satisfaction is “feeling gratified,” and interest/excitement is “feeling energized.” Lawler and Yoon (1993, 1996) describe interest/excitement as a forward-looking emotion, one based on an awareness of potential satisfaction in anticipation of possible gains, and pleasure/satisfaction as a backward-looking emotion, which occurs after something has been gained. Assuming partners in an exchange relation simultaneously look forward and backward, the relational cohesion theory explores whether the corresponding emotions mediate commitment behavior. Following this lead, we construe positive work emotion as a positively gratified or energized state resulting from the appraisal of one’s work experience.
Rediscovering different types of affect in the workplace in the mid-1980s and 1990s, organizational researchers have argued that job satisfaction is limited in understanding various affective work experiences because its measurement captures mainly evaluative and cognitive states rather than affective ones (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Researchers address this problem by incorporating interest/excitement as another key affective state and treating pleasure/satisfaction as a global emotion beyond specific job evaluation. As a motivating state of curiosity and fascination (Izard, 1977), interest/excitement captures more active aspects of affective experiences. When employees experience more empowering achievements through work and organizational activities, they tend to be emotionally aroused and gratified and they attribute the positive emotions to the relationship.
The positive work emotions triggered by empowerment experience constitute internal reinforcing stimuli for employees; employees who want to produce positive work emotions try to understand their sources; enhanced mutual dependence with their organization makes employees attribute their emotions to the relationship with the organization (Lawler, 2001, 2002). The emerging membership boundary with perceived membership support also prompts members to interpret the sources of their positive emotions and attribute them to the member-organization relationship itself. As members begin to perceive such a relationship as an emotionally and cognitively binding force, the relationship becomes objectified as a valuable third force unifying them with the organization.
The instrumental commitment develops into affective commitment when employees perceive a sense of unity with their membership organization. Validation and Normative Commitment We conceptualize instrumental commitment as an attachment to the utilitarian value of an organization and affective commitment as an attachment to the relational value with an organization. Similarly, normative commitment is defined as an attachment to the moral value for an organization. This definition of normative commitment is similar to Buchanan’s (1974) definition. Buchanan construes commitment in terms of an attachment to the long-term goals (or visions) and values of an organization. Weiner’s (1982) normative commitment is seen as personal convictions to the value system (e.g., missions and goals) of an organization. Weiner (1982) differentiates this form of normative commitment from the conventional normative commitment built upon generalized loyalty and duty. The conventional normative commitment requires members to be blindly loyal to the organization, where as normative commitment as personal convictions permits individual choice among distinctive value systems and initiatives to realize the chosen one (Weiner, 1982). The moral value of an organization as a target of normative commitment is determined by the cultural capital the organization holds.
Another researcher has defined normative commitment as members’ attachments to the moral value of their membership that proposes a mechanism though which affective attachment generates normative attachment. This mechanism requires a series of cognitive and evaluative work (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Wiener, 2001): First, members attempt to make broad sense of the relational value of affective attachment. Second, once a proper moral meaning of the relationship to an organization is primed then members begin to perceive an incipient moral value of the organization. Finally, members develop normative attachment to the organization, when they realize that the organizational values are also congruent with their personal values so that they begin to identify with it.
Once members develop normative commitment to their organization, they use the set of organizational mental models (i.e., visions, purposes, and values) more deliberatively in justifying and legitimating critical events in their organization. In particular, decisions members reach are guided more explicitly by the core values an organization holds (Barrett, 2003). Members incorporate corporate visions, values, and missions in articulating their own personal mental models (Levin, 2000). This infusion of a corporate mental model into members’ mental models in turn drives members’ greater engagement in realizing it by putting substantial effort and sacrifice into action.
Despite several powerful explanatory advantages, normative commitment has not drawn much research attention to date (Weiner, 2001) One reason is that normative commitment is conceptualized vaguely in terms of blind moral judgment and attitudes, which makes scientific scrutiny of its theoretical commitments difficult. Our model addresses this problem clearly by defining normative commitment as attachment to the moral value of a corporate mental model. Another reason is that some organizations may not yet have established their salient mental models as a foundation for normative commitment.
Recently scholars have begun to recognize the importance of normative commitment in understanding more dynamic aspects of organizational activities beyond performance and order (Collins and Porras, 1996; Kirkpatrick, Wlfford, & Baum, 2002; Kotter, 1996; Larwood, Fable, Kriger, & Miesing, 1995; Wiener, 1982). Along with this developmental focus, various behaviors as reflections of these underlying dimensions of attachment are identified. For example, compliance, turnover, and intention to stay are among the main behavioral indicators of instrumental commitment (Mathieu, 1991; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Williams & Hazer, 1986). Thus, organizational citizenship behavior can be construed as a behavioral indication of affective attachment (Organ, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000); and substantial contributions and sacrifice are a behavioral expression of normative commitment (Weiner, 1982).
When such affective and normative commitment behaviors are collectively expressed among members, they lay the foundations of ritualization and legitimation for an organization. Specifically, the collective behavioral expression of affective commitment through extra role behavior or organizational citizenship behavior constitutes organizational rituals invoking a shared membership identity and its affective value for all members (Durkheim, 1915). Similarly, the collective behavioral expression of sacrifices and significant contributions among members becomes a strong source of validity for those members who seek an endorsement of their personal propriety beliefs from other members (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Scott, 1987; Walker et al., 1986).
Furthermore, the collectively validated organizational mental model works as a guiding principle legitimizing the current organizational establishment of structure and process. In contrast with the principle of aggregation by rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990), ritualization and legitimation provide alternative principles explaining how individual actions are organized at the collective level.
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